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Introduction

While there is little to no doubt that the State of the Union address is now an important perennial ceremony for both the citizens of the United States and their leader, the actual intrinsic value of the address may not be as clearly defined as one may think Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution states that "[the president] shall from time to time give to Congress information of the State of the Union and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient."

The passage does not make reference to a formal address or even an annual or perennial affair; the president simply must inform Congress as to the general health of the union from time to time. Moreover, the passage states that the President is to inform Congress of this information and makes no mention of the general public. As such, the vast majority of presidents before the 20th century wrote their State of the Union in the form of a long letter meant for the eyes of Congress. While this letter was often published days or weeks later, this stands to show that the format of the State of the Union as well as its primary audience has changed dramatically.

The State of the Union address has evolved into the primary night of American political theater. It has become a platform for presidents to present their visions for the nation. With this in mind, the overarching goal of this paper is to gain a broader understanding of how presidents orient themselves during the State of the Union address. Understanding how presidents present themselves, given their personality traits and idiosyncratic styles, is vital to understanding the president as an individual. At the same time, one can gain both a broader perspective on how formal addresses and occasions such as the State of the Union are used by leaders to affect their political environment, as well as the narrower perspective of how the environment shapes each individual leader's use of the address as a tool. Based on what one learns from the interplay between context

and leader, one can build upon the vast knowledge already acquired in regards to how leaders and leadership functions. The experiment conducted here hopes to lend useful information to the ongoing study of the phenomena that are American political theater and political leadership. In the information gathered in this experiment, one will find that there is little to suggest that presidents are misusing their night in the spotlight by manipulating the opportunity solely to achieve partisan goals. This would seemingly bode well for State of the Union as an institution.

Literature Review

In the field of political psychology and the subfield of leadership personality study, United States' presidents always seem to make good topics for discussion, research, and debates. In their 2007 piece on presidential leadership, Thoemmes and Conway III cite two basic reasons for this general fascination with presidents:

On an extrinsic level, in setting up a research model, one should be able to gain insight into the underlying psychology of leadership in general. In principle, the very fact that the office of the presidency is not only known to all but has at least some modicum of effect in the lives of so many in the nation and across the world makes the position and those who inherit it a good case study for the psychological principles of leadership. This allows one to build models that focus on leadership behavior in shared externalities of the political environment that explain things about the psychological aspects of leadership and their importance more broadly in context. As a direct result of this, there have been vast amounts of audio, video and text materials relating to presidential matters that have been collected by public and private institutions use in research. This fact is reflected in the wealth of cumulative knowledge garnered by academics over the years. In short, the extrinsic benefits of studying the world's most renowned leader are evident.

In addition, there is a second reason for the popularity of presidents in political psychology research that Thoemmes and Conway III point out: presidents are simply fascinating individuals. There is a general belief that the select group of 43 men who have thus far

been elected to the highest office in the land have a distinct set of idiosyncratic characteristics, personality traits, flaws, strengths, and general quirks that allows them to function in a way that the average American citizen does not. It is because of this that we are driven to discover more about them as individuals, how they functioned and which idiosyncratic quirks made each man who and what he was.

With this in mind, one can garner a preliminary idea of the various situations in which the individual's idiosyncrasies interact most prominently with external contextual forces. Though it is impossible to say for sure, it is hard to make the case that two leaders, thrust into the same contextual situation, would arrive at the same solution and execute that plan to the same degree of success. Fred Greenstein (2009) offers a rather quaint rhetorical explanation in the form of a historical example. In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower chose to refrain from using military force to intervene in the struggle between Vietnamese and French forces, but would his Vice President and advisor, Richard Milhous Nixon, have arrived at that same decision? There has been no shortage of qualitative studies seeking to answer these types of questions and most do an adequate job displaying how differences in leadership personality affect politics on most levels.

The development of at-a-distance methods of personality study in the late 20th century has added an additional analytic depth to the study of leadership that allows one to view these idiosyncrasies in leaders in quantifiable terms. This depth has its advantages. For one, quantitative assessments are reproducible and cumulative, creating a more efficient and effective model for research and assessment of leaders. Additionally, these methods allow for a more conclusive and direct comparison of leadership personality, giving one a more concrete way of measuring the psychological differences between multiple leaders and a leader's psychological changes over time (Schafer & Walker 2006). The following research intends to assess both of the above by using Leadership Trait Analysis. Using this method, I seek to gain insight into the leadership personalities of the three most recent presidents: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama.

Leadership personality is an integral part of what one should consider to be a president's political skill. A president will often utilize certain traits to rouse the bully pulpit and create political momentum in a desired direction. While some leaders have an uncanny ability to win public support via their personability (Ronald Reagan), others simply lack the necessary traits (Jimmy Carter). However, personal charisma is a double-edged sword of sorts; Max Weber notes that while related personality characteristics can be a basis of authority under the right conditions, it can also breed a perception that depicts the president as almost superhuman, which undermines some of the rational thought processes of the collective public (Winter 1987).

There are often dire consequences when a president does not live up to the public's standards. There is a justifiable argument that the American public's general perception of presidential authority will often greatly overstate the inherent powers of the land's highest office. Meanwhile, there remains a general belief that a president has, or should have, a larger semblance of control than is often possible. This fails to account for the external political forces that affect a presidency, both as an individual and as an institution. Often and without their knowledge, much of the public's evaluation of a president's political skills, successes, and failures hinges greatly upon context and the situational opportunities that present themselves to the Commander-in-Chief. A quaint, modern example of this would be the negative relationship between gasoline prices and presidential approval ratings: when gas prices go up, approval ratings tend to drop. Though there is little a president can do to control gas prices, he often suffers the political consequences, justifiable or not. The unfortunate reality is that luck is a vital part of the political life, which is something that the public is often either unwilling or unable to accept.

This puts a great amount of importance on what Erwin C. Hargrove likes to call "strategic leadership." In other words, a leader's ability to take full advantage of the opportunities presented and maximize the value and use of the resources at his or her disposal is key. It is of the upmost importance that a president is able to present events in a way that allows him to highlight himself as the catalyst in

the creation of popular and successful policies while downplaying his role in shaping policies deemed as failures. Yet, despite the ubiquity of strategic leadership, the way in which a leader chooses to go about defining and executing the maximization of resources in a given context is not necessarily ubiquitous itself; idiosyncratic psychological traits factor into the way leaders choose to orient themselves to the problem at hand within the given context.

In this same vein, presidents go to great lengths to form a carefully constructed public face that simultaneously plays to their political strengths and psychological needs - both complimenting and reinforcing one another while forwarding the leader's political ambitions (Hargrove 1993). In this regard, world leaders are like actors, according to former President Richard Nixon, each with a different dramatic style:

> Some Great Leaders take pains to conceal their humanity; some flaunt it, even exaggerate it. There is a vast difference of style between the lofty grandeur of a de Gaulle and the earthy exuberance of a flesh-pressing Lyndon Johnson. Yet each was effective in his own way, in part because each man was, in a very real sense, larger than life. (Nixon 1982: 328)

This is not to say that presidents are "phonies." as Nixon explains. They are not so much manipulating the public's faith or distorting the truth as they are executing leadership in a style that they find both comfortable for themselves and fitting for the context. President Nixon's comparison of presidents to actors indirectly highlights the importance of political theater as a medium through which presidential leadership is exerted. Press conferences, speeches and interviews offer a stage for Nixon's actor-president through which he can simultaneously flaunt his oratory style, solidify his public image and flex the rhetorical and stylistic muscle he uses to persuade the public and his political peers. To this point, there is no stage larger and no spotlight brighter than the time-honored tradition of the State of the Union address.

The address itself was not always a public affair and was

certainly not the public spectacle it has become in the past several decades. The concept of addressing the public directly only became a practice within the last century, beginning as a simple radio address during the years of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. However, it should come as no surprise that technology has quickened the pace of the politics and changed the nature of the State of the Union. In a constantly shifting political environment, this annual address has become the one night of the year in which the entire American political universe grinds to a collective halt. The collective attention of the public, media, and political arena are given solely to the Commander-in-Chief. In short, there truly is no annual tradition or medium in American politics that is quite like the State of the Union in terms of scope, audience, or spectacle.

The State of the Union address is of particular significance because it provides a direct link to its target audience. This is because presidents have been able to communicate their respective messages with candor to the largest possible audience and without the skewing filter of the media until after the address has ended. It is because of this that the address serves as a perfect launching point for what Martha Joynt Kumar (1995) cites as the key factors in mobilizing support for policy change. Over the course of the 30 to 90 minutes, the president is able to define his goals and ambitions for the nation in concise and simple parameters. Often, State of the Union addresses have strongly-defined, reoccurring themes that can be synthesized into easily-understood slogans (i.e. Barack Obama's "Win the Future" sentiments in his 2011 address). In this regard, messages are almost always positive, and they maintain a focus on valence issues rather than controversial ones while informing the public as to why the proposed changes are necessary and beneficial to the country. Most importantly, both the message and the spotlight infer that the president is the centerpiece that is facilitating these changes.

With this being the case, the person implementing the policy change takes on a degree of importance comparable to the rhetoric itself. However, almost flawless execution is required to properly impart the desired message upon the audience. The media and the public seem to have a great interest in the President's speaking ability. More specifically, political pundit seems to have a penchant for

verbal gaffes, which undermine the president's message depending on the severity. Furthermore, the president cannot guarantee that the message he delivers, or the style in which he delivers it, will be interpreted in the fashion that he intended.

Such is the nature of the modern voter, who is generally most concerned with feeling like he or she is understood and his or her doubts and concerns will be alleviated. In other words, voters seek a president that shares many of the same cognitive concerns as his constituents (Bennett 1995; Winter 1987). Thus, various political and media entities have begun to travel to extraordinary lengths to frame the State of the Union in a way that serves to either feed into or quash the reserved doubts of the voting public. The most prominent example of this is the periodic and strategic body language and applause of the president's political peers during the address.

The president is true the focal point of the night's event and the address' success often hinges on how well he can use his own stylistic idiosyncrasies to relate to and arouse the public in a desired manner. The public is generally aware enough to pick up on an error in self-presentation, whether that be an air of apathy or an overzealous lack of authenticity and tend to react negatively (Glad 1993). Yet, the arousal of public attention following the State of the Union address is not stable and has not consistently resulted in positive gains in approval ratings (Gallup 2010). This line of thought hints that the State of the Union address is performed for solely political purposes. This concept is far from unpopular. In fact, presidential hopeful and former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney went as far as to label the President's 2012 State of the Union address as a glorified campaign speech, before the President even took the podium. Indeed, it would be rather naive to think that presidents give an address in a vacuum that is completely devoid of their own political ambitions. However, political initiatives are often composed of the combined aspects of policy purpose, personal ambition, and administrative style that comprise a political personality (Hargrove 1995). In this respect, it should be expected that all public displays that a president makes have some modicum of political ambition, or what Barbara Sinclair refers to as "purposive behavior" (Sinclair 1995).

Moreover, one must proceed with caution when assigning a definitive cause to a political action. As previously mentioned, it is rather easy to unintentionally develop an inaccurate phenomenology for a political action or pattern that has been stretched to fit one's own personal purposes or biases. Alexander L. George discusses this in his critique of James David Barber's famous work *The Presidential Character* (1974). It is not unreasonable to assume that a president's political opposition may have stronger biases and a weaker methodology than the average academic when assigning perceived purposes to the State of the Union address. Thusly, it is slightly unfair to assume that the content and presentation of the State of the Union is based solely around a president's desire to be reelected. At the same time, it is fair to beg the question of what degree the president adjusts his style to take advantage of the current state of the political environment.

Here, I run a quantitative analysis of State of the Union addresses since President Clinton's inauguration in 1993 to measure the subtle differences in the ways presidents orient themselves to the public. This time period spans three presidencies and a total of five presidential terms, making it a small but serviceable sample size. I intend to quantify the personality traits displayed in these addresses using Leadership Trait Analysis. This method was chosen specifically because of its cognitive complexity measurement, which will account for the amount of ambiguity presidents perceive in the world around them. Though I posit that some specific nuances should stay relatively stable, one could suspect that other specific categories (most notably conceptual complexity) will be altered so as to create a more concise, concrete, and reassuring message and image prior to the election campaigns. It is expected that there will be a significant and quantifiable difference between the personality traits evidenced during a midterm or presidential election year and a non-election year.

Method and Data

For this experiment, I have gathered the last twenty State of the Union addresses (a total of just over 129,000 words). They are composed of eight addresses delivered by Clinton (est. 60,500 words), eight by Bush (40,500 words), and four by Obama (28,000

words). It is apparent that President Bush delivered the shortest addresses. In fact, the longest State of the Union address which President Bush delivered (his 2008 address – about 5700 words) was far shorter than the shortest Clinton or Obama address (about 6340 words and 6070 words respectively). This is may likely be a reflection of President Bush's penchant for brevity and general discomfort in formal speaking situations (Greenstein 2009).

The key personality element highlighted in this experiment is conceptual (or cognitive) complexity, which represents a subject's sensitivity to subtle details in the political environment around him or herself. Leaders who have low conceptual complexity scores see the world in more definitive categories. In addition to a more black-and-white perception of their political environment, individuals with low conceptual complexity scores also tend to be less interested in the finer details of policy and more focused on policy outcomes, much like President Bush (Dyson 2009). Bush's low level of conceptual complexity has been well documented in the academic community. In fact, Bush's complexity scores tend to rank near the bottom of a ranking system that includes over 100 leaders from across the globe (Renshon 2005; Greenstein 2009; Dyson 2009). This is reflected in Bush's speech style, which he and others regard as blunt and straightforward. Though often criticized, Bush has traditionally never been afraid to speak his mind or cut straight to the heart of a controversial issue. This approach obviously has its benefits in certain scenarios, allowing for greater speed and decisiveness in times of crisis (Dyson 2009). Yet, leaders with lower conceptual complexity scores are more susceptible to groupthink and do run the risk of overlooking sensitive details that should be taken into consideration during the decision-making process (Renshon 2005).

Leaders with high conceptual complexity scores are able to see subtle areas of grey that their counterparts with low conceptual complexity scores do not. They maintain a much more nuanced view and pay much greater attention to the smaller details of policy initiatives. Clinton and Obama have generally been thought to have much higher cognitive complexity scores than Bush. Yet, while high scores in conceptual complexity are appealing, they are not necessarily the basis of a good leader or good policy, as Dyson (2009) explains:

> Theories of decision-making agree. Cognitive complexity is definitely preferred as are those who "score" higher on it. Complexity seems to have become the holy grail of good decision process. Yet, complexity has a number of downsides. Too much complexity can paralyze decisions, as many of Clinton's advisors found (Drew 2000). Clinically, paranoids are the most complex of thinkers, but few would argue that their complexity leads to better judgments. (Dyson 2009)

It is because of this that each president's conceptual complexity score should vary relative to each other. Yet, one could suspect that there will be a consistent fluctuation of each president's scores relative to themselves. This observable pattern would speak to the malleability of personality styles in a given context (in this case, election years) and the intertwinement of personality traits and that context.

Findings

The numerical data garnered in this experiment seems to generally reflect popular academic beliefs about each president's personal psychological profile. For example, the conceptual complexity measurements of presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, with the former showing scores that are consistently and significantly lower than the latter. President Clinton's conceptual complexity scores were quite low as well, which may be slightly surprising for a man who is regarded for his adamant attention to details (Greenstein 1995; Hermann 1995; Greenstein 2009). However, I suspect that this can be attributed to President Clinton's informal oratory style and tendency to improvise and use ad-lib techniques (Greenstein 2009).

Nonetheless, this experiment began with the notion that the elements of a president's Leadership Trait Analysis profile displayed in various State of the Union addresses would be altered under the context of an election year. Though one president's profile would differ due to personalized idiosyncrasies, these personal traits would fluctuate with the election cycle. However, the results of this test (shown below) do not evince many obvious patterns, refuting that

hypothesis.

My initial hypothesis had stated that conceptual complexity scores evinced in State of the Union addresses would fall during an election year; scores would drop so as to limit grey areas, simplify the underlying message, and limit doubts that the voting public may hold.

Year, President	B.A.C.E.	C.C.	Self Conf.
1993 Clinton	0.469	0.566	0.466
1994 Clinton - Election	0.512	0.529	0.336
1995 Clinton	0.477	0.6	0.4375
1996 Clinton - Election	0.432	0.474	0.247
1997 Clinton	0.44	0.366	0.32
1998 Clinton - Election	0.544	0.498	0.372
1999 Clinton	0.523	0.508	0.429
2000 Clinton - Election	0.515	0.514	0.355
Clinton Averages	0.489	0.507	0.37
2001 Bush	0.443	0.55	0.271
2002 Bush - Election	0.335	0.457	0.234
2003 Bush	0.391	0.518	0.297
2004 Bush- Election	0.405	0.476	0.372
2005 Bush	0.431	0.5	0.363
2006 Bush - Election	0.401	0.588	0.263
2007 Bush	0.485	0.526	0.368
2008 Bush - Election	0.468	0.567	0.133
Bush Averages	0.42	0.523	0.287
2009 Obama	0.444	0.598	0.382
2010 Obama - Election	0.433	0.6	0.33
2011 Obama	0.456	0.651	0.347
2012 Obama - Election	0.423	0.613	0.188
Obama Averages	0.439	0.615	0.312

However, the data above fails to display sufficient evidence to declare the above to be an observable reoccurring phenomenon. The table below shows much of the same: State of the Union addresses delivered in an election year tend to have a slightly lower cognitive complexity score. However, the margin in average scores between election year and non-election year scores is rather small. It is too small, in fact, to make a claim that Cognitive Complexity scores dip dramatically in regards to the election. Ultimately, State of the Union addresses delivered during an election year are, more or less, as likely to score higher than that president's average as they were to be scored lower. In addition, there was little evidence to suggest that a State of the Union address given in an election year would consistently score lower or higher than the previous or following year's addresses. Ultimately, this test yields no evidence to suggest that presidents make an active effort to become blunter or speak in more black-and-white terms during an election year.

President	B.A.C.E	C.C.	Self Conf.
Clinton Election Years	.5015	.5037	.3275
Clinton Non-Election Years	.4772	.51	.4131
Bush Election Years	.4022	.522	.195
Bush Non-Election Years	.4375	.5235	3247
Obama Election Years	.428	.6115	.259
Obama Non-Election Years	.4335	.6245	.3645

Though conceptual complexity measurements failed to yield the desired pattern, other measures of the Leadership Trait Analysis did reveal interesting highlights that are perhaps worth noting.

In terms of one's belief in ability to control events, there was no pattern that seemed to span the various presidencies. However, upon a closer inspection of the data, one can see that President

Bush's election year addresses had a tendency to score well below both his own average and below the scores of addresses made in the years both preceding and following them. Though limited in sample size, President Obama's election year addresses generally follow the same pattern. Contrary to this (though the pattern is not as clear as Bush's results), Clinton's election year addresses scored exceptionally high, both on an average and a year-to-year basis. Perhaps this suggests that the belief in ability to control events scores are generally idiosyncratic in pattern. More research (preferably with a larger sample size) would be necessary.

There was also one element of Leadership Trait Analysis that uncovered a discernible pattern that spanned all three presidencies: self-confidence, which had a was much consistently and significantly much lower in election years than non-election years. Maybe it should not come as a surprise to know that this is the case, as a president's party tends to lose seats in Congress over the course of a presidential term. Raised political stakes could account for a justified blow to a President's self-confidence. However, the line of thinking here assumes that the lowered self-confidence scores are unintentional consequences of context. It is not entirely unreasonable to think that presidents make an effort to come across as more modest during election years in an effort to create a feeling of empowerment in his voting constituency. In either case, it is difficult to accurately discern a president's intentions, or lack thereof, in this scenario.

Analysis

The lack of a clear pattern does not necessarily indicate that the leadership styles presidents put forward in State of the Union addresses are not malleable based on contexts. Instead, the findings simply seem to suggest that the rapidly approaching electoral races of a given year are not one of those contexts. One is inclined to argue that this reflects well on the State of the Union address and American civics more generally by somewhat refuting claims made by media and political figures (Zak 2012; Foster 2012; Bendery 2012) which label the State of the Union as a glorified campaign speech. There is quantitative precedent for said claims, suggesting that the president's annual address has not served as merely a tool used to

jumpstart his political party's campaign ambitions in the months prior to November elections. However, claims that a president is using the State of the Union address as a campaign speech will likely always be popular among the minority party and media entities, as they make for headlines and political attacks.

The content of a State of the Union address may still be highly politicized despite the lack of correlation between conceptual complexity scores in a given year and the timing of an upcoming election. Instead of focusing on the broad, long-term goal of winning reelection, all be it for the party or themselves, presidents may use their yearly address to call attention or draw attention away from more specific, time-oriented contextual issues of the moment. Clinton's 1998 State of the Union, which is widely regarded as a successful and well-spoken address, serves as an example. By maintaining focus on the strength of the US economy and his proposed policy initiatives, Clinton was able to defer and play down the importance of questions about the Monica Lewinsky scandal, which had leaked but a week before his address (Greenstein 2009). Ultimately, Clinton enjoyed the largest post-address jump in approval rating in the modern era (Gallup 2010, Greenstein 2009). It is also reasonable to hypothesize a connection between Clinton's initial framing of the Lewinsky scandal in his State of the Union address and Clinton's soaring approval ratings or his party's election gains that November (Greenstein 2009).

This is just one example of a more individualized context affecting the content of a president's State of the Union address. Yet, such presumptions fall victim to hindsight. Perhaps Clinton would not have altered the content of his address if the Lewinsky affair had not been leaked, and its success would not have been nearly as significant. Did the Lewinsky affair context make the address a success or did the address make the Lewinsky affair context politically beneficial? It is a chicken-and-the-egg argument. However, a theory that posits that individualized contexts, like the Lewinsky scandal, are the primary motivation behind a president's change of style in his yearly address would offer a better explanation for the seemingly random data patterns uncovered in the study. This is not to say that the annual context of elections does not factor into a president's style adjust-

ments: it suggests that the immediate political context in that moment would take precedent.

In addition, the pattern of lowered self-confidence scores in election years also suggests that presidents actually make an effort to appeal to the voting constituents' opinion rather than simplifying and feeding talking points to the public. These low levels of self-confidence could be the result of a number of things including an active effort to belay an air of arrogance (Nixon 1982: 332), an effort to empower and connect with the public on a subtle level (Winter 1987; Bennett 1995; Nixon 1982), or a simple (un)conscious acknowledgment of unfavorable odds (the president's party tends to lose seats in Congress as his term progresses, as previously mentioned). In any case, this lack of confidence represents the fact that presidents do not feel as though they can concretely direct public opinion or voting habits through their annual address. This opposes the notion behind the original hypothesis here, which posited that presidents adjust their styles because they honestly and confidently believe that it will have positive political ramifications.

To summarize, there seems to be little evidence in this model that would suggest that presidents are not generally inclined to change their psychological styles put forward in a State of the Union address solely because of the ebbs and flows of the election cycle. It becomes patently clear that psychological leadership styles fluctuate from year-to-year and from president-to-president. This is consistent with past literature which suggests that both the political contexts and the individuals that interact with those contexts are prone to changes great and small. While it is interesting and somewhat exciting to see a significant pattern in self-confidence levels that spans the three presidencies, it is not enough to say conclusively that these three presidents were using their big night of political theater to forward their own political interests in advance of the coming campaigns.

Future Research

The results and data found in this experiment are very exciting and should create a more-than-adequate starting point for future

research with similar methodologies. The following is simply a collection of research design variations, flaws in methodology, and other variables that should be taken into account in future research.

First and foremost, it is necessary to highlight that there are other methods of quantitative analysis in political psychology that could have been used for this experiment. Leadership Trait Analysis is traditionally used to measure spontaneous verbal materials (i.e. interviews), not formalized addresses such as the State of the Union. Operational Code Analysis might have been a more ideal choice for this research than Leadership Trait Analysis. However, while the conscious choice to utilize Leadership Trait Analysis may have been unorthodox, this analysis system was chosen specifically for its measurement of conceptual complexity, which is something that Operational Code does not measure. However, Operational Code Analysis offers a very logical next step in the ongoing research process. In addition, David Winter's quantitative Thematic Apperception Test (which measures achievement, affiliation, and power motives) in verbal material would also offer a unique and useful perspective and is worth considering (Winter 1987).

Ideally, a future expansion on this research would include a two-part analysis. The first part of such an analysis would be very similar to the research design seen here, using quantitative at-a-distance assessments to measure leadership psychology in order to view any patterns being evinced. One would then cross-reference those patterns with the American election cycle. However, one would instead use Operational Code Analysis, as it is a more appropriate measurement system for prepared speeches. The second part of the analysis would involve gathering interviews, press conferences, and other off-the-cuff responses made by the president in a close proximity to the State of the Union address. This represents the closest approximation one would have to a president's psychological state and style in a State of the Union address, while still allowing one to use a Leadership Trait Analysis system for its original intended purpose. After gleaning measurements from both analyses, one could paint a broader picture of presidential leadership psychology in the State of the Union address. Not only do I intend to create such a model in the near future, but I am currently in the process of collect-

ing texts and researching background information for such a model.

A final issue of note that deserves a more in-depth discussion than it received here is the degree of importance individual leaders put on public statements like the State of the Union address. The main concept of this paper focuses directly upon the motives that a president assigns to policy and polity issues within the address. While the study takes into account oratory and political skill, it does not offer a more definitive look into the motives put towards the State of the Union itself. For example, President George W. Bush put a much lower level of emphasis and importance on his annual address than his predecessor or successor; Bush was known to delegate much of the writing of his State of the Union address to ghostwriters and aides, much to his own detriment (Greenstein 2009). While we can make basic inferences from facts like this, it is important to note that these idiosyncrasies are deceptively easy to overlook. Moreover, said idiosyncrasies can have a drastic effect on quantitative research. In this particular example, Bush's ghostwriters may have unintentionally altered the president's style in his address. While ghostwriters are tasked with creating work that is virtually indistinguishable from the president's own words, the process is not perfect and evident differences in style patterns do become apparent when comparing the work of the president to that of his aides in a quantitative analysis (Sigelman 2002). This speaks to the difficulties of conducting an accurate at-a-distance assessment of leadership psychology. Nonetheless, quantitative assessments have been able to simulate a leader's psychological profile to a startlingly accurate degree and are generally difficult for the subject to intentionally manipulate (Schafer & Walker 2002). This makes such at-a-distance assessments an invaluable tool in the study of politics.

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